against
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Glasgow, Narayanan and Chandrasekaran 1995 "There
has been a tradition in psychology and philosophy that
dismisses mental images as epiphenomenal, 1.e. that they do
not causally participate in reasoning or problem
solving."
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personal
constructs
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Rudyard
Kipling, Something of Myself
Penguin 1988 (first published
1936)
"My office work had taught me to think
out a notion in detail, pack it away in my head, and work on
it by snatches in any surroundings. The lurch and surge of
the old horse-drawn buses made a luxurious cradle for such
ruminations. Bit by bit, my original notion grew into a
vast, vague conspectus - Army and Navy Stores list if you
like - of the whole sweep and meaning of things and effort
and origins throughout the Empire. I visualised it as I do
most ideas, in the shape of a semi-circle of buildings and
temples projecting out into a sea - of dreams ."
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Bishop
Berkley
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"28. I
find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure , and vary
and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more
than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my
fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way
for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very
properly denominate the mind active. This much is certain
and grounded on experience : but when we talk of unthinking
agents, or exciting ideas exclusive of Volition, we only
amuse ourselves with words.
29. But, whatever power I may have over
my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by
Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad
sunlight I open my eyes it is not in my power to choose
whether I shall see or no, or determine what particular
objects shall present themselves to my view: and so likewise
to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them
are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other
Will or Spirit that produces them.
30. The ideas of Sense are more strong,
lively, and distinct than those of the Imagination; they
have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are
not excited at random, as those which the effects of human
wills often are, but in a regular train or series - the
admirable connection whereof sufficiently testifies the
Wisdom and benevolence of its Author. Now the set rules or
established methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in
us the ideas of Sense, are called the laws of nature; and
these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and
such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in
the ordinary course of things." Bishop George Berkeley,
1710
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Wittgenstein
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"The
first thing he said the most fundamental doctrine propounded
in the Tractatus, is that propositions are pictures. That is
not put forward as a metaphorical description, a way of
saying somewhat more graphically that propositions represent
the world. He took the claim that propositions were pictures
very, very seriously. He kept insisting that they were
literally pictures. And this leads to a second doctrine that
pictures have elements that correspond to the scene they
picture. Propositions are essentially composite things, as
is shown in sentences which are made of different words :
the proposition is made of words functioning as names, and
the names correspond directly to the objects which enter
into the fact - the names are arranged in the sentence as
the objects are arranged in the fact. Attached to this is
the view that the world, if it is to be capable of being
represented in language must be an arrangement or an array
of objects which have various possibilities of being
combined with one another. What actually is the case is the
way those objects are arranged. That has the consequence
that the essential meaningful content of discourse - of
language that is put to the really crucial use of which
language can be put - is its picturing the facts that
constitute the world.... Wittgenstein never gives any
examples of these fundamental pictorial propositions -
perhaps none of the propositions we utter in everyday life
would be examples. But his requirement that if language is
to be meaningful it must have a definite sense , and that
this definite sense consists in its performing an
essentially pictorial task, this for him necessitates that
every genuine proposition , even if it is not a single
picture, must, if it is to be meaningful, be a vast complex,
a conjunction, of pictures." Of Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Tractatus, published in Austria in 1921 and the UK in 1922.
Anthony Quinton, in Brian Magee's Men of Ideas OUP Oxford
1978 speaks of LW.
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creativity
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"In
contemporary research on human cognition, topics such as
retrieving memories, generating images, and solving problems
have typically been explored in what are essentially
non-creative contexts. Being creative is one of the most
important things that a person can do, yet there is little
one can actually learn, about creativity from reading the
current cognitive literature. Indeed, if a person were to
ask "What can I do to act more creatively ?" few answers
could be found in most of the cognitive studies that have
been conducted up to now." from Finke Ward Smith,
Creative Cognition, MIT Press Cambridge 1996 [1992] p.4
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eyes shut
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" I have only to shut my eyes to feel how
ignorant I am whence these forms and coloured forms, and
colours distinguishable beyond what I can distinguish,
derive their birth. These varying and infinite co-present
colours, what are they ? I ask to what do they belong in my
waking remembrance ? and almost always never receive an
answer. Only I perceive and know thatwhatever I change, in
any part of me, produces some change in these eye-spectra;
as, for,instance, if I press my legs or change
sides."
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, December 19th,
1803, from Anime
Poeta.
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history
of
imaging
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"The psychological study of imaging has
had a curious history over the past half century. Following
the pioneer work of Sir Francis Galton, there was lively
interest in the topic. Then starting in about the twenties,
progressively less attention was paid to imaging, until
today [1957] it is a process more discussed by novelists and
literary men than by psychologists... Psychologists have
stoopped making substantial contributions to the study of
imaging for the simple reason that, in the absence of
objective methods for its observation, there are few if any
new contributions to be made."
Ian M.L.Hunter,
MEMORY Facts and
Fallacies,
Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1961 [1957]
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