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References:
Descartes approaches the nature of knowledge by considering what we
can say we “know” and can provide evidence for.
The evidence of the senses is discarded as potentially unreliable
and that the only thing we can be sure of is that it is us doing the
thinking, hence: “I think therefore I am” (Descartes,
Discourse on Method, section 4, part 19, 1968)
Knowledge therefore is treated like a building block with reason as
our means by which we can “grasp that knowledge in a meaningful
way” (Sedgwick, p.7, 2001)
“Descartes has formulated the view that not only are we rational
beings made of a substance called ‘mind’ but what is also
distinctive about us is that we use our reason to gain knowledge.
Reason is the essential tool or ‘instrument’ that can
serve us in our search for certain knowledge” (ibid. p.8)
Through conscious thought the thinker, or subject, has awareness of
his existence or subjectivity: “his philosophy is a philosophy
of consciousness.” Sedgwick is far from persuaded ‘though
about Descartes’ explanations concerning the outside world of
which our senses report. Descartes attests that God is responsible
since existence is more perfect than the lack of it and God is, after
all perfect (ibid, p.8/9)
A problem exists between the physical substance of the mind and the
conscious being doing the thinking (Descartes, Discourse on Method,
section 5, part 32, 1968)
Empiricism asserts that our sense experinces must be the source of
our ideas/knowledge and when we think: “it is these ideas we
think about. The ideas we have are the result of the qualities
bodies have. And a quality ‘is the power to produce any
idea in our mind’ ” (Locke, cited in Sedgwick, p.12, 2001)
“The important point to note is that Locke’s central claim
about ideas concerns their origin: ideas cannot be claimed to derive
from any universal and innate principles which lie ready made within
the human mind” (ibid.)
“The senses at first let in particular ideas and furnish the
as yet empty cabinet: And the mind by degrees growing familiar with
some of them, they are lodged in the memory” (ibid.)
Locke divide knowledge into two areas
1. Sensations – knowledge
received from the senses
2. Reflections – knowledge
gained or made by the mind thinking about the sensations and clustering,
comparing etc. the ideas involved
(Locke, 1962)
“We recall our ideas by way of ‘memory and imagination’.
The function of memory, it follows, is to preserve ‘the original
form’ in which ideas are presented to the mind in terms of their’order
and position’. Imagination allows us to combine these
ideas in new ways…..But does it follow from this that our ideas
can be put together in any way that we choose? Hume thinks not”.
(Hume, cited in Sedgwick, p.18, 2001)
Ideas (and by implication memories) are linked together by resemblance,
contiguity in time and space,and by ‘cause and effect’
– Hume’s big contribution to thought (ibid). Cause
and effect links ‘ideas’ as in fire and heat. We
receive ideas from our senses and “it is on the basis of memory
that we draw inferences from the ideas caused by these impressions.
Our beliefs, therefore, are those ideas that which strike us with
the greatest force or ‘vivacity’, such that it would be
perverse to deny them’ ”. (Hume, cited in Sedgwick, p.22,
2001)
Knowledge (and by implication memory) can be defined as “nothing
more than this: something strange is to be reduced to something familiar”
(Nietzsche, section 355, 1974)
Nietzsche questions our understanding of what we know in two ways:
1. How we know things
2. How reliable our knowledge
is
(ibid.)
Henri Bergson defines perception as the internal representation of
external objects which contrasts with memory as a process of “preservation
of the departed moment” (Mullarkey, p.89, 1999)
In Bergson’ view matter “inscribes” itself through
our perception, mind then “appropriates” the matter.
Our understanding therefore consists of “planes of consciousness”
with perceptions as a surface “carved out against the background
of matter” where sense perceptions and memories collide as ideas.
(ibid. p.90-95, 1999)
Jean-Paul Sartre made clear the connections between our awareness
of an “I” ie. our self awareness or consciousness, and
our understanding that “I” had existed in the past ie.
our ability to store and recollect past experiences (see Being and
Nothingness, 1993)